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Abstract
This paper studies the propagation and properties of a confidence shock in a structural
vector autoregression (VAR) model with and without financial variables. The addition
of a financial block does not considerably change the propagation and the contribution
to the forecast error variance by the confidence shock. Nevertheless, for specific his-
torical episodes, the inclusion of a financial block plays a role. In several recessions,
the VAR with the financial block assigns a smaller role to confidence shocks for the
fall in GDP. This suggests that the confidence shock may not be properly identified in
a structural VAR when financial variables are omitted. Further, I identify a financial
channel by which the confidence shock affects economic activity.
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1 Introduction
In the empirical literature, confidence shocks are seen as an important driver of business cy-
cles, especially in the short run (see, e.g., Barsky and Sims, 2012; Beaudry, Nam, and Wang,
2011; Fève and Guay, 2018).1 These shocks, which are unrelated to changes in technology,
shift expectational variables about economic activity and have the flavor of mood swings
or animal spirits.2 Typically, papers that study confidence shocks using structural vector
autoregression (VAR) models do not contain financial variables. This lack of a financial
block is potentially problematic, because the confidence shock may be misidentified. The
shock might be misidentified since financial variables are inherently forward-looking and are
likely to reveal useful information about expectations of future economic activity. Further,
confidence can also react strongly to financial market conditions, and vice versa, as was
observed, for example, during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. If confidence reacts to financial
markets conditions, this reaction may erroneously be picked up as a confidence shock when
the model specification does not control for a financial block. Including a financial block is
also interesting because this addition enables the identification of a financial transmission
channel of the confidence shock. Myohl and Stucki (2018) show in a DSGE model that
financial frictions affect the propagation of confidence shocks both on impact and in the
medium run.
In this paper, I identify a confidence shock in a structural VAR, using US data. I
investigate the effect of adding a financial block on the properties of the identified confidence
shock. The VAR without the financial block contains total factor productivity (TFP),
consumption, GDP, hours worked and two expectational variables: the forecast of GDP and
consumer confidence.3 I begin the analysis by identifying two shocks that explain movements
in TFP. First, a surprise technology shock is identified as the only shock that drives TFP
contemporaneously. Second, a news shock about future TFP is identified as in Barsky and
Sims (2011). Next, the identification of the confidence shock follows Levchenko and Pandalai-
Nayar (2015). More precisely, the confidence shock is identified as the shock orthogonal to
the two technology shocks that maximizes the contribution to the residual forecast error
variance (FEV) of the forecast of GDP and consumer confidence in the short run. The
confidence shock thus explains movements in these expectational variables once movements
in TFP have been controlled for. In contrast to Levchenko and Pandalai-Nayar (2015), who
only use the forecast of GDP or the consumer confidence index, this specification features
both series. While the consumer confidence series can be riddled with errors, the series will
still add valuable information in order to improve the identification of the confidence shock.
In a second step, I add to the VAR a financial block that contains variables that are
directly related to the financial market and financial conditions. In particular, I augment the
vector of variables with the Chicago Fed’s National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI), the
stock market, credit, and investment. To ensure that the confidence shock does not pick up a
1Some theoretical papers that study the role of confidence or sentiment shocks on fluctuations of macroe-
conomic aggregates are, for example, Angeletos and La’O (2013), Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas (2018), Huo
and Takayama (2015), and Benhabib, Wang, and Wen (2015).
2Here I refer to the interpretation of Keynes (1936), that human behavior can be driven by spontaneous
instincts and emotions.
3The choice of variables closely follows Barsky and Sims (2011) and Levchenko and Pandalai-Nayar
(2015).
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financial shock, I identify a financial shock in the augmented VAR specification. Conditional
on the two technology shocks, I identify the financial shock as the shock that maximizes
the contribution to the short-run residual FEV of the NFCI. Therefore, in the augmented
VAR, the confidence shock is identified conditional on the two technology shocks and the
financial shock. The two VAR specifications allow comparing if and how the properties of
the confidence shock change with the addition of a financial block.
The confidence shock’s overall role for business cycle fluctuations does not considerably
change by adding the financial block. Both, the impulse response functions (IRFs) and the
FEV decomposition are quite similar. In both VAR specifications, the confidence shock leads
to a positive co-movement across macroeconomic aggregates and explains a considerable
share of the FEV in the short run. However, for some specific business cycle episodes,
the pattern of the identified confidence shocks and their role for economic activity differ
considerably when the financial block is added. I illustrate this observation with the following
experiment. I perform several historical counterfactuals where the confidence shock is shut
off. This exercise tells us how, say, GDP would have evolved in the absence of confidence
shocks, and how much of the fall in GDP can be attributed to the confidence shock. I find
that in several recessions, the VAR with the financial block assigns a much smaller role to
confidence shocks for the fall in GDP. This suggests that the confidence shock is misidentified
when the financial block is not included in the VAR but the misidentification issue is only
problematic for some specific episodes.
The inclusion of a financial block allows the identification of a financial transmission
channel of confidence shocks, connecting the paper to a theoretical literature that studies
a financial transmission channel of confidence shocks (see, e.g., Angeletos, Lorenzoni, and
Pavan, 2010; Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan, 2013; Benhabib, Liu, and Wang, 2016). In
the augmented VAR, following a positive confidence shock, financial conditions are tighter
than average after a couple of quarters. To identify the transmission channel, I use the
technique by Bachmann and Sims (2012) and neutralize the effect of financial conditions
on the propagation of confidence shocks. I find that if financial conditions were unchanged
following a positive confidence shock, then economic activity would be higher in the medium
run. This observation is consistent with Myohl and Stucki (2018) who find that following a
positive confidence shock, financial conditions have a negative impact on economic activity
in the medium run.
Finally, this paper also connects to the literature that considers financial shocks as a
source of macroeconomic fluctuations (see, e.g., Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno, 2014;
Meeks, 2012; Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012; Caldara, Fuentes-Albero, Gilchrist, and Zakra-
jšek, 2016). As noted by Benati and Kyriacou (2017), financial shocks such as credit shocks
or uncertainty shocks display similar features as a confidence shock. Hence, an identified
financial shock may be polluted by a confidence shock and vice versa. This concern can be
addressed by changing the identification ordering of the financial shock and the confidence
shock and by comparing the identified impulses of each shock between the two orderings.
More precisely, I identify the confidence shock ordered third, conditional on the two tech-
nology shocks. The financial shock is then identified ordered fourth, conditional on the
two technology shocks and the confidence shock.4 The identified impulses of the confidence
4The identification strategy is recursive. By ordered third, I mean the shock is identified conditional on
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shock are very similar and are highly correlated. The same is true for the impulses of the
financial shock. This result suggests that the structural VAR with the financial block can
disentangle the financial shock and the confidence shock relatively well.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the
identification of shocks. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 performs robustness checks
with regard to the recent financial crisis and considers an alternative to the NFCI series.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical strategy
This section describes the data and the identification strategy of the structural shocks.
2.1 Data and specification of the reduced-form VAR
The first block of the VAR consists of total factor productivity, consumption of services and
nondurables, GDP, hours worked, the forecast of the next quarter’s GDP and a consumer
confidence index. The data for TFP is the utilization-adjusted series of Fernald (2014) which
is based on the methodology of Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006). Real GDP, real con-
sumption of services, and real consumption of non-durables are taken from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). Because there is no chain-weighted series for the sum of consump-
tion of non-durables and services, I use the Tornqvist approximation to construct this series.5
The data for hours worked are aggregate hours worked in the non-farm business sector from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). To construct the GDP forecast series, I use the mean
forecast of growth rates of the Survey of Professional Forecasters of the Philadelphia Fed.
The survey provides level forecasts, but because of changing base years the forecasts are
not comparable in levels. I, therefore, construct the implied GDP forecast level series by
multiplying the real GDP series with the mean forecast of the growth rate. These series
are the same as used in Barsky and Sims (2011) and Levchenko and Pandalai-Nayar (2015).
For the confidence measure, I use the Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index. The
index measures consumers’ current and future perceptions (in six months time) about em-
ployment and business conditions.6 Consumption, GDP, and hours worked are transformed
into per capita series by dividing them by the civilian non-institutional population of the
BLS.7 Finally, all series except the confidence index are logarithmized.
In the second block of the VAR, I add variables that are sensitive to financial conditions
and markets. As a measure of financial conditions, I use the NFCI which summarizes fi-
nancial conditions in money markets, debt and equity markets, and the traditional and the
“shadow” banking systems. The index is constructed to have an average of zero. Positive
values imply that financial conditions are tighter than average and negative values indicate
two previously identified shocks. Ordered fourth means the shock is identified conditional on three previously
identified shocks. The identification strategy is described in more detail in the next section.
5For issues with adding chain-weighted components, see Whelan (2000).
6I also evaluate robustness with respect to other data series. Replacing the forecast with the (current
quarter’s) forecast error leads to the same results qualitatively. The results are also robust to replacing the
mean of the forecast growth series with the median. Replacing the conference series with other commonly
used series from the Surveys of Consumers of the University of Michigan does not change the picture either.
7I apply the HP-filter on the population series to smooth out apparent changes in the construction of
this series.
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that conditions are looser than average. The index is updated weekly and I take the average
of each quarter. Further, I include three additional variables, the S&P 500 Index, credit
to nonfinancial corporations, and investment. The data for the S&P 500 is obtained from
Robert Shiller’s website.8 I take the average of the monthly data and divide it by the GDP
deflator from the BEA. The series for credit is from the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, namely “Nonfinancial Corporate Business; Credit Market Instruments;
Liability” and is also deflated by the GDP deflator. Real investment is obtained from the
BEA. The series for investment, credit, and the S&P500 are also calculated per capita and
logarithmized.
I estimate the VAR with quarterly data from 1971Q1 to 2007Q4. The starting date is
dictated by the availability of the NFCI. The observation period stops at the end of 2007
to exclude the financial crisis (see 4.1 for a discussion). Following Barsky and Sims (2011)
and Levchenko and Pandalai-Nayar (2015), the VAR is estimated in (log) levels because
parameter estimates are consistent in the presence of co-integration. In contrast, vector
correction error models may be misspecified if the co-integration is of unknown form (this
follows the recommendation of Hamilton, 1994). I choose two lags, as selected by the final
prediction error criterium.9
2.2 Identification of the structural shocks
The identification of the shocks follows the maximum forecast error variance approach of
Uhlig (2003) and Barsky and Sims (2011). Shocks are identified by maximizing their contri-
bution to the forecast error variance (FEV) of a target variable between 0 and H periods.
Let the reduced-form VAR(p) model be
Yt = B0 +B1Yt−1 + . . .+BpYt−p + ut, Et[utu
′
t] = Σ,
where Yt is a vector of k observable series at time t, ut is the vector of the reduced-
form innovations and Σ is the covariance matrix of the innovations. The moving-average
representation is then given by Yt = C(L)ut, where C(L) ≡ [B(1)]−1B0 + [B(L)]−1,
B(L) ≡ I −B1L− . . .−BpLp and C(L) ≡ I + C1L+ C2L2 + . . . .
We assume there exists a linear mapping between the innovations ut and structural
shocks εt, i.e.
ut = A0εt.
Assuming the structural shocks have unit variance, the matrix A0 must then satisfy A0A′0 =
Σ. This condition is for example satisfied by the Cholesky decomposition A∗0 of Σ. The
space of possible impact matrices is then given by A0 = A∗0D where D is any orthonormal
matrix, i.e. DD′ = I.
Maximizing the share of the forecast error variance. The approach of Uhlig
(2003) and Barsky and Sims (2011) boils down to the following exercise. Given a candidate
8www.econ.yale.edu/∼shiller/data.htm
9The Schwarz and the Hannan-Quinn information criteria indicate one lag which is rather short, while
the Akaike information criterium always selects the maximum lag length. Another option would be to choose
four lags, as is also common in the literature. The propagation of the confidence shock is qualitatively similar
with regard to these lag lengths.
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matrix A∗0—e.g. the Cholesky decomposition of Σ—we look for a column vector d of an
orthonormal matrix D such that the impact vector A∗0d maximizes the share of the FEV.
In other words, we look for the linear combination of innovations ui,t that maximizes the
share of the FEV of the target variable over a certain horizon. Once found, A∗0d is then the
impact vector associated with the identified structural shock that contributes the most to
the FEV.10
The h-step ahead forecast error of variable i is defined as
yi,t+h − Et−1 [yi,t+h] = e′i
h∑
l=0
ClA
∗
0Dεt+h−l,
where ei is a unit vector with one in the i-th position and zeroes elsewhere. The share of
the FEV of variable i due to shock j at horizon h is then
Ωi,j(h) =
e′i(
∑h
l=0 ClA
∗
0Deje
′
jD
′A′∗0 C
′
l)ei
e′i(
∑h
l=0 ClA
∗
0A
′∗
0 C
′
l)ei
.
The ei’s select the FEV of variable i. The ej ’s select the column j of D, identifying the
shock j that maximizes the share of the FEV. Let Dej = dj . The expression above can be
rewritten as
Ωi,j(h) =
e′i(
∑h
l=0 ClA
∗
0djd
′
jA
′∗
0 C
′
l)ei
e′i(
∑h
l=0 ClΣC
′
l)ei
.
The vector dj that maximizes the share of the FEV of variable i between 0 and H periods
is then the solution d∗j to the following problem:
d∗j = argmax
dj
H∑
h=0
Ωi,j(h) = argmax
dj
H∑
h=0
e′i(
∑h
l=0 ClA
∗
0djd
′
jA
′∗
0 C
′
l)ei
e′i(
∑h
l=0 ClΣC
′
l)ei
. (1)
The numerator of the fraction in (1) can be rewritten in the following way:11
e′i(
h∑
l=0
ClA
∗
0djd
′
jA
′∗
0 C
′
l)ei =
h∑
l=0
trace[(eie′i)(ClA
∗
0dj)(d
′
jA
′∗
0 C
′
l)]
=
h∑
l=0
trace[(d′jA
′∗
0 C
′
l)(eie
′
i)(ClA
∗
0dj)]
= d′j(
h∑
l=0
A′∗0 C
′
leie
′
iClA
∗
0)dj .
10In Uhlig (2003), the structural shock is identified as the shock that explains as much as possible of
the FEV. In Barsky and Sims (2011) and Levchenko and Pandalai-Nayar (2015), the structural shocks are
identified as the shocks that maximize the contribution to the FEV, or, in other words, the share of the
FEV. I follow the latter approach.
11First, note that the ei’s pick the ith element of the matrix inside the sum. The same can be achieved by
taking the trace after applying the selector matrix eie′i which leaves all elements on the diagonal but i equal
to zero. The second equality follows because permutations of a matrix product leave the trace unchanged.
Finally, the third equality follows because the object inside of the trace is a scalar and, because of linearity,
the dj ’s can be taken outside of the sum operator.
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Applying this result to equation (1), we can rewrite:
d∗j = argmax
dj
d′jSdj , (2)
where
S =
H∑
h=0
∑h
l=0A
′∗
0 C
′
leie
′
iClA
∗
0
e′i(
∑h
l=0 ClΣC
′
l)ei
.
Note that the object S entirely consists of objects derived from the reduced-form VAR. With
the restriction that dj is a unit vector, the Lagrangian of this problem is
L = d′jSdj − λ(d′jdj − 1)
and the first order condition is12
Sdj = λdj .
That is, d∗j is an eigenvector of S with eigenvalue λ. Multiplying both sides with d′j yields
d′jSdj = λ,
which is just the expression to be maximized in (2). It follows that d∗j is the eigenvector
of S associated with the largest eigenvalue. To solve the problem, it is therefore sufficient
to calculate the eigenvector decomposition of S and extract the eigenvector associated with
the largest eigenvalue. This returns the impact vector A∗0d∗j of the identified shock.
Maximizing the share of the forecast error variance of two variables. The
problem from (1) can be adapted to identify a shock that maximizes the share of the FEV
of two variables. The problem becomes
max
d
µd′S1d+ (1− µ)d′S2d s.t. d′d = 1,
where Si is the matrix that sums the shares of the FEV of variable i, i = 1, 2, and µ is the
relative weight between the two shares of the FEV. The Lagrangian reads
L = µd′S1d+ (1− µ)d′S2d− λ(d′d− 1)
and the first order condition is
µS1d+ (1− µ)S2d = λd
⇔ [µS1 + (1− µ)S2] d = λd.
It follows that the vector d is an eigenvector of the weighted sum of S1 and S2. Multiplying
both sides with d′ again implies that d is the eigenvector associated with the largest eigen-
value.
12Because S is symmetric: ∂d
′Sd
∂d
= 2Sd.
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In the following, I describe the recursive identification and its implementation. It is
recursive in the sense that each shock is identified conditional on the previously identified
shock(s).
Surprise technology shock and news shock. Following Barsky and Sims (2011),
the assumption is that technology is driven by two shocks. More precisely, it is driven by a
surprise technology shock, that drives TFP contemporaneously and a news shock that drives
TFP in the future. For example, the process tfpt = tfpt−1 + ε
surprise
t + ε
news
t−j with j > 0
would satisfy this assumption.
The surprise technology shock is identified as the only one driving TFP contemporane-
ously. With TFP ordered first in the VAR, the surprise technology shock is then identified
as the first column of the Cholesky decomposition and is simply the reduced form innovation
in TFP, u1,t.13
Next, the news shock is identified as the shock that maximizes the share of the residual
FEV of TFP between 0 and 40 quarters and is orthogonal to the identified surprise technology
shock.14 The shock is identified by maximizing its contribution to the residual FEV, because
a part of the FEV is explained by the already identified surprise technology shock.
We solve the problem
max
d̄2
d̄′2Sd̄2 s.t. d̄
′
2d̄2 = 1, d̄2(1) = 0,
where the subindex 2 signifies that (without loss of generality) d̄2 is the second column
vector of the matrix D̄. The first constraint ensures that d̄2 has unit length as D̄ needs to
be orthonormal. The second constraint ensures that the news shock is orthogonal to the
surprise technology shock and does not drive TFP on impact. Given the zero entry in d̄2(1),
this problem is equivalent to taking the eigenvalue decomposition (see above) of the lower
(N − 1)× (N − 1) submatrix of S. Ordering the eigenvectors by their eigenvalues—from the
highest to the lowest—gives an orthonormal basis that fills out the lower (N − 1)× (N − 1)
block of the matrix D̄. The first column of D̄ is the unit vector e1 such that the first column
of the Cholesky matrix A∗0 and thus the identification of the surprise technology shock is
unchanged. The matrix D̄ is then orthonormal and the new candidate impact matrix for
the subsequent identification of the financial shock is Ā0 = A∗0D̄. The first and the second
column of Ā0 are the impact vectors of the surprise technology shock and the news shock,
respectively.
Financial shock. The financial shock is identified as the shock that maximizes the share
of the residual FEV of the financial condition index between zero and four quarters and is
orthogonal to the surprise technology shock and the news shock.15 This financial shock
captures fluctuations in financial conditions that are unrelated to innovations in technology.
13Given that the surprise technology shock is the only one driving TFP on impact, with A0εt = ut, it
follows that u1,t = A0(1, 1)ε1,t, as A0(1, n) = 0, n > 1. The impact vector is then determined uniquely.
Because it must be that A0A′0 = Σ, it follows σ1,1 = A0(1, 1)
2, σ1,2 = A0(1, 1)A0(1, 2) etc. The first column
of A0 is the impact vector of the surprise technology shock and determined uniquely.
14The choice H = 40 follows Barsky and Sims (2011) and Levchenko and Pandalai-Nayar (2015).
15Choosing a different horizon, say H = 2, 6 or 8, leads to results that are qualitatively and quantitatively
very similar.
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Therefore, Ā0 = A∗0D̄ is the new candidate impact matrix and we look for a vector d̃3 of an
orthonormal matrix D̃. Setting d̃1 = e1 and d̃2 = e2 ensures that the previously identified
technology and news shocks are held fixed. The restrictions that the first two columns of D̃
are the first two unit vectors and that D̃ is orthonormal implies that the first two entries
of the remaining column vectors are zero. The column vector corresponding to the impact
vector of the financial shock is thus the solution to the following problem:
max
d̃3
d̃′3Sd̃3 s.t. d̃
′
3d̃3 = 1, d̃3(1) = d̃3(2) = 0.
Given the restriction that the first two entries are zero, solving this problem is again equiv-
alent to taking the eigenvector decomposition of the (N − 2)× (N − 2) lower submatrix of
S and finding the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue. Again, the remainder
of D̃ can be filled with the remaining eigenvectors. The new candidate impact matrix for
the identification of the confidence shock is thus Ã0 = Ā0D̃.
Confidence shock. The confidence shock is identified as the shock that maximizes the
share of the residual FEV of the forecast of GDP and the confidence index between zero
and two quarters conditional on the two technology shock and the financial shock.16 That
is, the shock explains fluctuations in the forecast of GDP and confidence that are unrelated
to movements in TFP or innovations on the financial market. Movements in the forecast of
GDP and consumer confidence that are related to information about TFP and shocks on
the financial market should be accounted for by the previous three shocks.
Mechanically, the identification of the confidence shock works in the same manner as for
the news shock and the financial shock. However, we now look for a vector d that maximizes
the contribution to the FEV of two variables. Therefore, we have two S-matrices, Sgdpf for
the forecast of GDP and Sconf for the confidence index. In order to hold the three previously
identified impact vectors constant, the new candidate matrix that enters Sgdpf and Sconf
is Ã0 and the first three columns of the new orthonormal matrix D̂ are the first three unit
vectors. The problem is then
max
d̂4
d̂′4[µSgpdf + (1− µ)Sconf ]d̂4 s.t. d̂′4d̂4 = 1, d̂4(1) = d̂4(2) = d̂4(3) = 0.
With the restriction that the first three entries of d̂4 are zero, the problem can be solved
by taking the eigenvalue decomposition of the lower (N − 3) × (N − 3) submatrix of the
weighted sum of Sgdpf and Sconf . We again look for the eigenvector associated with the
largest eigenvalue, place it in the fourth column and fill out the remainder with the remaining
eigenvectors. Finally, the impact matrix with the identified shocks is then Â0 = Ã0D̂ =
A∗0D̄D̃D̂. By construction, Â0 satisfies the condition that Â0Â′0 = Σ. The first four columns
of Â0 are then, in this order, the impact vectors of the surprise technology shock, the news
shock, the financial shock and the confidence shock.
In the baseline specification, I choose µ = 0.5, that is, the confidence shock maximizes
the share of the FEV of the two variables equally.17
16In the baseline specification I choose H = 2, following Levchenko and Pandalai-Nayar (2015). Choosing
a longer horizon, say, four or eight quarters does not change the results qualitatively.
17The value of µ does not influence the propagation mechanism of the confidence shock qualitatively but
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3 Results
This section presents the results. In 3.1, I compare the properties of the confidence shock
across the two VAR specifications and show that while the IRFs and the contribution to
the FEV are largely similar, the pattern of shocks can differ in specific episodes. Section
3.2 exemplifies this result by looking at counterfactuals during recessions which assess the
contribution of confidence shocks to the fall in GDP. In 3.3, I isolate the effect of finan-
cial conditions on the propagation of confidence shocks. Finally in 3.4, I show that the
specification with the financial block can disentangle financial shocks and confidence shocks
relatively well.
3.1 Comparison of the two structural VAR specifications
In order to assess the impact of augmenting the VAR with the financial block, I first dis-
cuss the propagation of the identified shocks in the smaller VAR specification with TFP,
consumption, GDP, hours worked, the forecast of GDP and the consumer confidence index
only. Since this specification does not include any financial variables, I do not identify a
financial shock. The identified confidence shock is ordered third, conditional on the sur-
prise technology shock and the news shock. Therefore, the identified confidence shocks can
only be compared up to a certain degree across the two structural VAR specifications. In
particular, I only compare the qualitative shape of the propagation and not the amplitude.
3.1.1 VAR without the financial block
Figure 1 shows the IRFs to a confidence shock for the first, small, specification. TFP
decreases initially, however, the response is zero after one year. This is consistent with the
identification restriction that the confidence shock does not move current or future TFP.
The shock leads to a positive co-movement of consumption, GDP and hours worked. The
responses revert to zero after 10 quarters and turn slightly negative thereafter. This pattern
reflects a rather short-lived transitory effect of the confidence shock. These responses are
similar to Levchenko and Pandalai-Nayar (2015) except that in their specification it takes
longer for the response to return to zero. The main reason for this difference seems to
be that they include the financial crisis in their sample (see 4.1). Table 1(a) presents the
contribution by the confidence shock to the FEV. The confidence shock explains the majority
of the FEV of GDP, hours worked and consumer confidence up to a horizon of one year.
The confidence shock still explains 51 percent of the FEV of consumer confidence and 44
percent of the FEV of hours worked at the five-year horizon. For consumption, the shock
explains 17 percent of the FEV on impact.
Figures 9 and 10 in the Appendix depict the responses of the variables to the surprise
technology and news shocks. The response of TFP to its own innovation is transitory.
Consumption, GDP and the forecast of GDP increase on impact and then revert back,
whereas the response of hours worked is negative. Consumer confidence is positive on impact
and reverts back and is negative 15 quarters after impact. In response to the news shocks,
TFP increases and has a peak response around 15 quarters after impact. Consumption
affects (by construction) the contribution to the FEV between the forecast of GDP and consumer confidence.
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Figure 1: Confidence shock; small VAR.
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Note: Confidence bands are obtained with 2000 bootstrap replications and cover 68% and 90%.
Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
Table 1: FEV contribution of the confidence shock
(a) w/o financial block (b) w/ financial block
impact 2Q 1Y 2Y 5Y impact 2Q 1Y 2Y 5Y
TFP 0 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Consumption 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.05
GDP 0.53 0.66 0.55 0.37 0.19 0.43 0.50 0.35 0.22 0.11
Hours 0.68 0.80 0.77 0.66 0.44 0.53 0.59 0.49 0.35 0.22
GDP Forecast 0.65 0.64 0.51 0.34 0.19 0.53 0.47 0.33 0.20 0.10
Confidence 0.66 0.65 0.61 0.56 0.51 0.74 0.60 0.50 0.38 0.32
Financial Conditions - - - - - 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05
S&P 500 - - - - - 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Credit - - - - - 0.05 0.15 0.23 0.25 0.13
Investment - - - - - 0.16 0.44 0.33 0.20 0.17
Note: Numbers indicate the share of the forecast error variance explained by the shock. With the
financial block, the confidence shock is identified fourth, conditional on the financial shock.
is higher on impact and initially rises before it reverts back to zero, as does consumer
confidence. GDP and hours worked rise slowly, and the response of hours worked is negative
on impact.
3.1.2 VAR with the financial block
Here I add the financial block to the VAR and study the propagation of the confidence shock
of the augmented VAR. Given the tight connection between confidence and the financial
sector (c.f. Myohl and Stucki, 2018), one would expect the financial block to have an impact
on the propagation mechanism. Indeed, many coefficients on the lags of the financial block
are significantly different from zero. Moreover, the series of the financial block Granger
cause the series of the smaller VAR specification and, in particular, the confidence index
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Figure 2: Confidence shock; augmented VAR
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Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
series.18
However, Figure 2 shows that the responses to a confidence shock are largely similar
to those described in Figure 1.19 The response of TFP is again zero, suggesting that the
identified shock is orthogonal to movements in current or future TFP. Also, the shock leads to
the same co-movement in consumption, GDP and hours. One observable difference is that at
the horizon of twenty quarters, the 68% confidence bands now includes zero for consumption,
GDP and hours worked. The response of consumer confidence is also comparable between
the two specifications. Initial optimism falls below zero after 15 quarters, just as in the
previous specification without the financial block. To sum up, there is no considerable
difference in the IRFs between the two specifications.
Nevertheless, the financial condition index is clearly impacted by the identified confidence
shock. Financial conditions are significantly looser than average on impact but are tighter
than average between five and up until ten quarters after impact. Thus, the confidence shock
leads to a significant and prolonged tightening in financial conditions after five quarters. The
confidence shock also leads to an expansion in credit and investment on impact, which are
therefore co-moving with consumption, GDP and hours. In contrast, the stock market
index does not increase. The response of investment shows a hump shape and becomes
significantly negative after 15 quarters, possibly as a result of the tight financial conditions.
18I conduct a Wald test following Lütkepohl (1993). The Null hypothesis that the financial block is not
Granger-causal for the first block can be rejected with a p-value of 0.00.
19Of course, these two specifications could simply be observationally equivalent in terms of the observed
IRFs.
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As a measure of leverage in the economy, I also graph the response of credit over the stock
market. The median response of leverage is positive after a couple quarters, but the response
is not significant. The result of the response of investment falling below zero is consistent
with Myohl and Stucki (2018). In Myohl and Stucki (2018), entrepreneurs overleverage their
net worth following a confidence shock. The overleveraging eventually leads to a depressed
net worth and subsequently to a fall in investment below its long-run trend.
The contribution to the FEV of the confidence shock gives a similar picture as without the
financial block (see Table 1). Overall, the numbers are the same or a little lower. The lower
numbers can partly be explained because the confidence shock is now identified conditional
on the financial shock. However, the confidence shock still accounts for a sizable contribution
to the FEV. The confidence shock explains up to 50 percent of the FEV in GDP and more
than half of the variation in hours worked on impact and at the two-quarter horizon. It
also explains 18 percent of the FEV in consumption at the same horizon. On impact, the
confidence shock now explains more of the FEV of the confidence index compared to the
VAR without the financial block. The contribution to the FEV of TFP and the financial
condition index is almost zero, indicating that the identified confidence shock is not polluted
by a shock driving TFP or financial conditions. The confidence shocks also explain very little
of the FEV of the stock market, which is primarily explained by the news shock and the
financial shock. Further, the confidence shock explains a sizable portion of the FEV of credit
and investment. For example, at a horizon of two quarters, the confidence shock explains 44
percent of the FEV of investment and more than the financial shock at most horizons (see
Tables 1(b) and 2(a) in the Appendix).
Figure 11 in the Appendix depicts the IRFs to the financial shock. TFP slightly increases
and then decreases but is zero in the medium run. Financial conditions are significantly
looser than average but tighten over time. After five quarters, financial conditions are tighter
than average and the peak response is ten quarters after impact. Consumption increases on
impact and over time, while the responses of GDP, hours worked, and consumer confidence
are zero on impact and increase over time. Overall, the financial shock also leads to a positive
co-movement. In particular, credit has a similar response as GDP and hours. Interestingly,
the response of investment is significantly negative on impact but turns quickly positive and
begins to revert back to zero once financial conditions are tighter than average. The stock
market increases significantly and the response is still positive after 20 quarters. With a
relatively weaker response in the expansion of credit, leverage, measured as credit over the
stock market is significantly lower.
Figures 12 and 13 in the Appendix show the responses to the surprise technology shock
and the news shock. The propagation of the surprise technology is similar to the VAR
without the financial block. Investment increases on impact and financial conditions are
tighter than average after five quarters. The response of credit is negative and the response
of the stock market is zero and negative after 20 quarters. The news shock also leads to
a similar response of all variables. Financial conditions are looser than average after three
quarters and then revert back to the average. The response of the stock market to the news
shock is positive, and credit and investment also increase with a peak response after seven
quarters.
Overall, the IRFs and the FEV decomposition of the augmented VAR with a financial
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Figure 3: Scatter plot of identified confidence shocks
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Note: Scatter plot of identified impulses of the small VAR against the augmented VAR. Left:
specification where the confidence shock is ordered fourth (baseline). Right: specification where
the confidence shock is ordered third. The blue line is the 45◦- line.
sector do not change much from the VAR without the financial sector. And this is true not
only for the confidence shock but also for the surprise technology shock and the news shock.
However, the identified impulses can have a different magnitude across the two specifica-
tions. In Figure 3, I compare the identified confidence shocks with and without the financial
block when the shock is identified fourth (left panel) and when it is identified third (right
panel). The impulses are scattered relatively close around the 45◦-line: The correlations are
0.81 and 0.77, respectively.20 While at times the identified impulses are very similar, they
can differ substantially. This suggests that there are episodes where the inclusion of the
financial block is potentially important. I explore this idea with the help of counterfactuals
in the next subsection.
3.2 Historical counterfactuals
In this section, I discuss historical counterfactuals of US recessions since 1971, shutting off
one identified shock at a time. The counterfactuals begin at the start of the recession and
simulate how GDP evolves in the absence of, say, the confidence shock. This exercise tells
us how much this shock contributed to the fall of GDP during the recession. I first show
in 3.2.1 that when I control for the financial sector and financial shock, the counterfactual
may assign a smaller role to confidence shocks. I then discuss the contribution of financial
and confidence shocks during the same recessions in 3.2.2.
3.2.1 Does the financial block matter?
Figure 4 shows the evolution of actual GDP (dashed blue), the counterfactual evolution of
GDP in the absence of confidence shocks in the VAR without the financial block (red), and
20The right panel in Figure 3 serves as a robustness check to ensure that the difference is not due to the
fact that, in the augmented VAR, the confidence shock is identified conditional on an additional shock—the
financial shock.
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Figure 4: Contribution of confidence shock; small and augmented VAR
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Note: The graphs display the percentage deviation to the quarter before the business cycle
peak. Confidence shocks are set to zero from this date onwards.
in the VAR with the financial block (black). Each panel depicts one recession as identified
by the NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee. The grey-shaded area indicates the time
between the business cycle peaks and troughs identified by the committee. The series are
normalized to equal zero in the quarter before the peak, which is the last quarter where the
three series coincide. The graphs thus depict the percentage deviations from this date.21
If the two counterfactual series differ substantially from each other, this implies that
the two VAR specifications assign a different role to the confidence shock for the evolution
of GDP. For example, during the Volcker recession (top right panel), the VAR with the
financial block assigns a small role to the confidence shock, as the counterfactual practically
coincides with the actual evolution of GDP. In contrast, in the VAR without the financial
sector, the fall of GDP is two percentage points lower, hence assigning a significant role to
the confidence shock. Similarly, during the Great Recession (bottom right panel), the VAR
with the financial block indicates that in the absence of confidence shocks, the trough of
GDP is almost as deep.22 In the VAR without the financial block, however, counterfactual
GDP falls about one percent only, assigning a large share of the drop in GDP to confidence
shocks. On the other hand, after the dot-com bubble in 2001, a comparable role is assigned
to the confidence shock across the two VAR specifications.
This comparison suggests that while the identified confidence shocks do not differ in
terms of IRFs and FEV decompositions, in some episodes, historical counterfactuals assign
a different role to the contribution of confidence shocks to movements in GDP. That is,
for some specific business cycle episodes, the confidence shock is misidentified when the
VAR lacks the financial block since the identified confidence shocks play a different role for
21I start the counterfactual in the quarter before the start of the recession; starting the counterfactual
one period before or later does not substantially change the counterfactuals.
22I extend the sample to 2015Q3 and reestimate the VAR for the counterfactual during the financial
crisis.
15
Figure 5: Contribution of confidence shock and financial shock; augmented VAR
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economic activity.
3.2.2 Historical contribution of confidence shocks and financial shocks
In Figure 5, I consider the augmented VAR and analyze the contribution of financial (red)
and confidence shocks (black) during the US recessions. For the 1973–74 recession (first
panel), both financial and confidence shocks play a rather small role. In both counterfactuals,
the recession ends at the same time and the fall in GDP is 1.6 percentage points lower without
financial shocks. In 1980 (second panel), in the absence of confidence shocks, GDP falls by
two percent instead of three percent, while the financial shocks do not contribute to the fall
in GDP. The counterfactuals during the Volcker recession (third panel) show that without
financial shocks, the fall in GDP is around 1 percentage point lower and the economy escapes
the recession sooner. The contribution assigned to confidence shocks is even smaller, which
is in line with the idea that primarily a monetary policy shock contributed to the recession.
For the early 1990s recession (fourth panel), the counterfactual series indicate that without
confidence shocks, the fall in GDP is much milder without confidence shocks. GDP barely
falls, and the bulk of the recession can be attributed to confidence shocks. A similar picture
is observed in the 2001 recession (fifth panel). Without confidence shocks, GDP actually
grows after the burst of the dot-com bubble, while financial shocks do not contribute to the
fall in GDP. Finally, the sixth panel depicts the Great Recession. The counterfactual series
without confidence shock shows that at the beginning of the recession, confidence shocks
contribute to the fall in GDP. Two quarters into the recession, GDP is even higher in the
absence of confidence shocks. Nevertheless, the fall of GDP is only delayed. The trough is
barely higher and delayed by one quarter in the absence of confidence shocks. On the other
hand, the financial shock substantially contributes to the fall in GDP. The trough is 3.7
16
percent below the peak instead of the realized drop of 5.7 percent. In addition, the recovery
starts sooner in the absence of financial shocks.
Overall, these counterfactuals are in line with common perceptions about the nature of
shocks that caused these recessions. For completeness, Figure 27 in the Appendix displays
the counterfactuals where the surprise technology shock and the news shock is shut off.
3.3 Isolating the financial channel
Augmenting the VAR with the financial condition index allows assessing the indirect effect of
financial conditions on the propagation of confidence shocks. Variables not only react directly
to a confidence shock but also indirectly to (the lags of all) the other variables’ responses.
I isolate the effect of financial conditions by using the approach of Bachmann and Sims
(2012), and Fève, Garcia, and Sahuc (2018) and “shut off” the indirect effect of the financial
condition index. More precisely, I feed into the model a series of hypothetical financial
shocks that zero out the response of the financial conditions index. Stated differently, at
each horizon, I calculate the size of a financial shock that drives the financial condition
index back to zero. This exercise answers the following question: How would the economy
react to a confidence shock if at the same time the economy is hit concurrently with a series
of financial shocks that offset the reaction of the financial condition index to a confidence
shock? The comparison between this hypothetical response and the original response allows
assessing whether financial conditions matter for the transmission of confidence shocks.
Figure 6 graphs this hypothetical response, together with the IRFs to the confidence
shock. The IRFs start to diverge from the original IRFs after around five quarters. The
only exception is for TFP, suggesting, that the financial channel does not affect the level
of technology. The results indicate that the tighter financial conditions after five quarters
have a negative effect and the expansion would be longer lasting if financial conditions were
not tightening. More credit would be handed out and investment would not fall below zero.
Overall, it takes longer for all responses to return to zero. The identification of the financial
channel shows that financial conditions have an impact on the propagation of confidence
shocks.
Remark. Of course the other variables also react to the sequence of hypothetical finan-
cial shocks, which keeps this a structural exercise. However the size of the shocks are rather
small—the mean of the absolute value of the shocks is 0.047 compared to a shock of size one
for the confidence shock. As an additional exercise, I perform the following, non-structural,
exercise: Instead of feeding hypothetical financial shock into the system, I assume there is
an additional shock that drives the financial condition index back to zero and does not affect
any of the other variables.23 These IRFs are quite similar, especially for GDP, hours worked,
confidence, and investment (see Figure 14 in the Appendix).
3.4 Disentangling confidence and financial shocks
Figures 2 and 11 in the Appendix show that the IRFs and thus the propagation of the finan-
cial and the confidence shock differ substantially. While both lead to a positive comovement
23Mathematically this is equivalent to simply deleting the row and column with the financial condition
index in the structural VAR and then computing the IRFs with this shrunk VAR. This gives the same
outcome as when I simply fix the financial condition index at zero for all lags.
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Figure 6: Isolating the financial channel
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Note: Red: IRFs to the confidence shock where, in addition, concurrent hypothetical financial
shocks offset the response of the NFCI to the confidence shock. Black: Original IRFs to a
confidence shock with 90% Bootstrap confidence bands.
in consumption, GDP, hours worked, and consumer confidence (and to a lesser degree also
in credit and investment), the impact responses differ. The variables are positive on impact
following a confidence shock. In contrast, the IRFs to the financial shocks are zero on impact
and rise over time. The response of the stock market also differs: It is positive following a
financial shock but zero in response to the confidence shock.
However, since the shocks are identified recursively, the possibility remains that the
financial shock is polluted by the confidence shock. I, therefore, change the recursive identi-
fication ordering to see whether my identification scheme would identify a different financial
shock if it is identified conditional on the two technology shocks and the confidence shock.
After identifying the confidence shock ordered third, I also identify the financial shock in the
same manner as before but conditional on the confidence shock, and thus ordered fourth.
Figure 7 compares the identified structural financial shocks (left panel) and the confidence
shocks (right panel). The x-axis indicates the size of the identified impulses when the shock
is ordered third and the y-axis indicates their size when the shock is ordered fourth. Clearly,
the identified shocks are scattered closely around the 45◦line—the correlation is 0.98 for both
panels. Therefore, the identification scheme identifies a comparable financial shock when it
is identified conditional on the confidence shock. The IRFs and the FEV decompositions
are also quite similar.24
24See Figures 15 and 16, and Tables 2 and 3 in the Appendix. The contributions to the FEV by the
confidence shock are somewhat higher for most horizons and variables if the confidence shock is identified
third, compared to when it is ordered fourth. The same is true for the financial shock.
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Figure 7: Disentangling
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Note: Scatter plot of identified shocks, ordered third vs. ordered fourth. Blue line is the
45◦-line.
This exercise of changing the identification ordering suggests that the specification with
the financial block can disentangle the confidence shock and the financial shock relatively
well. Whether the confidence shock is identified conditional on the financial shock or not
has no considerable impact.
4 Robustness
This section discusses robustness with regard to the inclusion of the financial crisis and the
replacement of the NFCI with a credit spread index.
4.1 Including the financial crisis
I estimate the same VAR, from 1971Q1–2015Q3 and thus include the financial crisis. Figures
17–20 in the Appendix show that the IRFs are not significantly different except for the IRFs
to the financial shock. In the sample that includes the financial crisis, the responses of
consumption and GDP are still significantly positive after 20 quarters in response to the
financial shock. Similarly, it takes longer for the responses of investment and credit to go
back to zero. This suggests that when the financial shock is identified in the sample with
the financial crisis, it identifies a shock that has a more permanent effect.25
The inclusion of the financial crisis allows looking at the shock pattern between the
two VAR specifications during this episode. As seen by the counterfactual in Figure 4, the
financial block can play a role for the identified shocks and their effect on economic activity.
The left panel of Figure 8 displays the pattern of confidence shocks in the VAR without the
financial block (left panel) after 2001. The right panel displays the pattern of confidence
and financial shocks in the VAR with the financial block. In 2008Q3–Q4, the VAR without
a financial sector identifies large negative confidence shocks, whereas large negative financial
25I also estimated a VAR with the sample 1983Q1–2007Q4 to exclude times when financial conditions
were very tight and volatile during the 1970s. The propagation of the confidence shock is quite similar
compared to the baseline sample.
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Figure 8: Including the financial crisis
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Note: Structural shocks after 2000. Left: VAR without the financial block. Right: VAR with
the financial block.
shocks are identified in the VAR with the financial sector and shock. Therefore, in the VAR
without the financial block, the identified confidence shock appears polluted by a shock to
financial conditions in this episode.
4.2 Replacing the NFCI with a credit spread
Another financial variable that is often used to identify a financial shock is a credit spread.
I run the same VAR with the credit spread index of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) in
place of the financial condition index. The credit spread index is constructed of interest
rates of corporate bonds on the secondary market over the interest rates of synthetic risk-
free securities that feature the same duration as their corporate counterparts. Gilchrist
and Zakrajšek (2012) show that their credit spread index has considerable predictive power
for economic activity. Replacing the NFCI with the credit spread index does not change
the propagation of the confidence shock.26 Similarly, the propagation of the other shocks
are comparable (see Figures 21-24 in the Appendix). However, the recursive identification
ordering of the financial and the confidence shock matters as the identified shocks deviate
quite a bit, depending on whether the shocks are identified ordered third or ordered fourth
(see Figure 25 in the Appendix). The correlation between the identified shocks is only 0.89,
for both the confidence shock and the financial shock. This suggests that with the credit
spread index in place of the NFCI, the identified financial shock is partially polluted by
the confidence shock and the disentangling between financial and confidence shocks is more
difficult. Indeed, the financial shock explains up to 40 percent—up from 20 percent in the
baseline VAR—of the FEV of the confidence index at the one-year horizon, more than the
identified confidence shock (see Table 5 in the Appendix).
Finally, the historical counterfactuals are largely similar. One noticeable difference is
that the specification with the credit spread index assigns a much larger role to the financial
shock for the Great Recession. In fact, without financial shocks, GDP barely falls (see Figure
26The sample starts in 1973Q1, the first date for which this series is available.
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26 in the Appendix).
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates how the addition of a financial block to a structural VAR changes the
properties of the identified confidence shock. Looking at the propagation of the shock and
the contribution of the shock to business cycles in terms of the FEV contribution, there is
little difference. However, for specific episodes, controlling for a financial block is important.
Especially during episodes where financial markets are in turmoil, such as financial crises,
the confidence shock can be misidentified if the VAR specification does not feature a financial
block. For example, during the Great Recession, the specification that lacks a financial block
falsely identifies a confidence shock as a main driver. This observation, and the identification
of the financial channel confirm the commonly held perception that confidence is sensitive
to financial conditions and vice versa.
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A Appendix
A.1 Additional figures
Figure 9: Surprise technology shock; small VAR
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Note: Confidence bands are obtained with 2000 bootstrap replications and cover 68% and 90%.
Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
Figure 10: News shock; small VAR
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Note: Confidence bands are obtained with 2000 bootstrap replications and cover 68% and 90%.
Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
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Figure 11: Financial shock; augmented VAR
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Note: Confidence bands are obtained with 2000 bootstrap replications and cover 68% and 90%.
Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
Figure 12: Surprise technology shock; augmented VAR
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Note: Confidence bands are obtained with 2000 bootstrap replications and cover 68% and 90%.
Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
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Figure 13: News shock; augmented VAR
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Note: Confidence bands are obtained with 2000 bootstrap replications and cover 68% and 90%.
Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
Figure 14: Isolating the financial channel; alternative
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Note: Red: IRFs to the confidence shock where financial shocks offset the response of the NFCI
to a confidence shock. Red dashed: IRF of the reduced VAR with the NFCI is fixed to zero.
Black: Original IRFs to a confidence shock with 90% Bootstrap confidence bands.
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Figure 15: Confidence shock, ordered third
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Note: Confidence bands are obtained with 2000 bootstrap replications and cover 68% and 90%.
Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
Figure 16: Financial shock, ordered fourth
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Note: Confidence bands are obtained with 2000 bootstrap replications and cover 68% and 90%.
Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
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Figure 17: Surprise technology shock, 1971Q1-2015Q3.
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Note: Confidence bands are obtained with 2000 bootstrap replications and cover 68% and 90%.
Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
Figure 18: News shock, 1971Q1-2015Q3.
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Note: Confidence bands are obtained with 2000 bootstrap replications and cover 68% and 90%.
Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
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Figure 19: Financial shock, 1971Q1-2015Q3.
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Note: Confidence bands are obtained with 2000 bootstrap replications and cover 68% and 90%.
Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
Figure 20: Confidence shock, 1971Q1-2015Q3.
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Note: Confidence bands are obtained with 2000 bootstrap replications and cover 68% and 90%.
Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
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Figure 21: Surprise technology shock, GZ credit spread index
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Note: Confidence bands are obtained with 2000 bootstrap replications and cover 68% and 90%.
Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
Figure 22: News shock, GZ credit spread index
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Note: Confidence bands are obtained with 2000 bootstrap replications and cover 68% and 90%.
Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
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Figure 23: Financial shock, GZ credit spread index
0 10 20
-0.01
0
0.01
TFP
0 10 20
-0.01
0
0.01
Consumption
0 10 20
-0.01
0
0.01
GDP
0 10 20
-0.01
0
0.01
Hours
0 10 20
-0.01
0
0.01
GDP forecast
0 10 20
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Confidence
0 10 20
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
Credit spread
0 10 20
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
S&P 500
0 10 20
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Credit
0 10 20
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Investment
0 10 20
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
Credit-S&P 500
Note: Confidence bands are obtained with 2000 bootstrap replications and cover 68% and 90%.
Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
Figure 24: Confidence shock, GZ credit spread index
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Note: Confidence bands are obtained with 2000 bootstrap replications and cover 68% and 90%.
Bias-correction of the IRFs and computation of the confidence bands has been implemented as
in Kilian (1998).
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Figure 25: Disentangling: GZ spread index
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Note: Scatter plot of identified shocks. The NFCI is replaced with the GZ credit spread index.
Figure 26: Contribution of confidence shock and financial shock; GZ spread index
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Note: The graphs display the percentage deviation to the quarter before the business cycle
peak. Shocks are set to zero from this date onwards.
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Figure 27: Contribution of all shocks
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Note: The graphs display the percentage deviation to the quarter before the business cycle
peak. Shocks are set to zero from this date onwards.
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A.2 Additional tables
Table 2: FEV contribution of the financial shock
(a) ordered third (b) ordered fourth
impact 2Q 1Y 2Y 5Y impact 2Q 1Y 2Y 5Y
TFP 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Consumption 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.04
GDP 0.02 0.12 0.23 0.23 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.16 0.09
Hours 0.03 0.07 0.21 0.30 0.24 0.10 0.04 0.12 0.20 0.17
GDP forecast 0.01 0.17 0.25 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.16 0.09
Confidence 0.00 0.17 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.13
Financial Conditions 0.95 0.86 0.73 0.57 0.51 0.88 0.84 0.72 0.55 0.47
S&P 500 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.18
Credit 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
Investment 0.06 0.08 0.21 0.26 0.21 0.11 0.06 0.16 0.20 0.17
Note: Numbers indicate the share of the forecast error variance explained by the shock.
Table 3: FEV contribution of the confidence shock, ordered third and fourth
(a) ordered third (b) ordered fourth
impact 2Q 1Y 2Y 5Y impact 2Q 1Y 2Y 5Y
TFP 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Consumption 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.16 0.07 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.05
GDP 0.38 0.55 0.44 0.30 0.15 0.43 0.50 0.35 0.22 0.11
Hours 0.46 0.62 0.57 0.46 0.30 0.53 0.59 0.49 0.35 0.22
GDP Forecast 0.48 0.53 0.41 0.27 0.14 0.53 0.47 0.33 0.20 0.10
Confidence 0.71 0.67 0.59 0.47 0.40 0.74 0.60 0.50 0.38 0.32
Financial Conditions 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05
S&P 500 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Credit 0.03 0.13 0.22 0.26 0.14 0.05 0.15 0.23 0.25 0.13
Investment 0.11 0.45 0.38 0.26 0.21 0.16 0.44 0.33 0.20 0.17
Note: Numbers indicate the share of the forecast error variance explained by the shock.
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Table 4: FEV contribution of the surprise technology shock and the news shock
(a)Surprise technology shock (b) News shock
impact 2Q 1Y 2Y 5Y impact 2Q 1Y 2Y 5Y
TFP 1 0.89 0.84 0.73 0.44 0 0.03 0.07 0.18 0.50
Consumption 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.22 0.31 0.36 0.42 0.45
GDP 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.17 0.29 0.38
Hours 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04
GDP forecast 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.22 0.33 0.40
Confidence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.20 0.22
Financial Conditions 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.07
S&P 500 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.24
Credit 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.28
Investment 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.30
Note: Numbers indicate the share of the forecast error variance explained by the shock.
Table 5: FEV decomposition with the GZ spread
(a) Financial shock (b) Confidence shock
impact 2Q 1Y 2Y 5Y impact 2Q 1Y 2Y 5Y
TFP 0 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Consumption 0.13 0.24 0.23 0.16 0.06 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.05
GDP 0.04 0.28 0.36 0.29 0.14 0.44 0.43 0.31 0.21 0.11
Hours 0.02 0.15 0.27 0.31 0.24 0.57 0.58 0.45 0.34 0.24
GDP forecast 0.02 0.29 0.34 0.27 0.13 0.61 0.45 0.32 0.21 0.10
Confidence 0.03 0.36 0.4 0.35 0.29 0.67 0.42 0.34 0.26 0.22
Credit spread index 0.79 0.80 0.76 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03
S&P 500 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.26 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02
Credit 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.18 0.21 0.11
Investment 0.00 0.15 0.26 0.25 0.19 0.21 0.49 0.38 0.25 0.19
Note: Numbers indicate the share of the forecast error variance explained by the shock. Compared
to the baseline specification, the NFCI is replaced with the spread of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012).
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